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BEYOND THE SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY:
ADDRESSING THE CROSS-BORDER
RESOLUTION GAP
Irit Mevorach*
ABSTRACT
This Article compares the development of cross-border solutions for
resolving and reorganizing commercial entities to those solutions available
for financial institutions. This Article argues that the resolution regime for
financial institutions needs to move forward from the existing international
best practices approach, embodied in the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
Key Attributes for Resolution Regimes, to a more formal legal framework
for cross-border resolution, similar to the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law for Cross-Border
Insolvency. In doing so, this Article identifies a gap in the international
infrastructure for resolutions. While UNCITRAL promulgated a model law
to provide for cross-border insolvencies in 1997, there has been reluctance
to take a similar path with regard to the resolution of international financial
institutions, even though the stakes are very high. This Article addresses
possible reasons for this reluctance, draws lessons from the commercial
sphere, and explores the relevance of the UNCITRAL Model Law
framework to financial institutions. This Article also analyzes the recent
FSB initiative on cross-border resolution and the recently promulgated
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Resolution Stay
Protocol that seek to promote certainty in the application of resolution
measures across borders. This Article argues that these primarily contractbased initiatives are important contributions to the standardization and
improvement of the standards on the treatment of financial contracts in
insolvency and resolution. However, the initiatives are still incomplete.
Addressing the cross-border gap requires the recognition of goals beyond
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certainty, in the design of a cross-border framework for financial
institutions.
INTRODUCTION
The international legal architecture supporting cross-border insolvency1
and cross-border resolution2 is not complete. UNCITRAL in 1997
promulgated its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the Model Law),
a framework for global insolvency and restructuring of international
commercial enterprises.3 The Model Law does not, however, specifically
address the cross-border resolution of international financial institutions.
More recently, in 2011, an international standard for the resolution of
Significantly Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)Pthe Key Attributes
of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (the Key
Attributes)Pwas promulgated by the FSB.4 This resolution standard5
identifies domestic best practices and includes specific principles
concerning the cross-border aspects of resolution regimes. However, it does
not set forth a detailed cross-border resolution framework with legislative
provisions that can be enacted uniformly across countries4 legal systems.
Since the 2007R2009 financial crisis, there have been urgent calls for
action, including by standard-setting institutions, to develop such a
framework, and key elements have been proposed by international

1. This Article uses the terms Ninsolvency8 and Nbankruptcy8 interchangeably to refer to a
broad range of insolvency solutions for commercial entities, including reorganization and
liquidation.
2. This Article uses the term Nresolution8 to refer to a broad range of resolution solutions and
activities for both bank and non-bank financial institutions in distress, including, reorganization
and liquidation. The Article also refers to cross-border resolution of both bank and non-bank
financial institutions. Indeed, banking may be the main activity of these international financial
institutions, or, their activities may extend beyond simple deposit-taking and lending, covering a
full range of non-bank financial activities. Specifically, many Nsystemically-risky international
financial groups are, at their core, investment banks and broker-dealersa8 IMF, Resolution of
Cross-Border BanksKA Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination, Report by the Legal
and Monetary and Capital Markets Departments (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter IMF 2010]. The
problem of coordinating resolution action raises similar issues with respect to both bank and nonbank financial institutions. See id.
3. See U.N. COMM4N ON INT4L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2
(2014) [hereinafter MODEL LAW]. The Model Law was adopted in 1997, while the Guide to
Enactment and Interpretation of the Model Law was revised in 2013.
4. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
(2011)
[hereinafter
KEY
ATTRIBUTES],
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf?page_moved=1 (the
Key Attributes were updated in Oct. 2014 providing, in Annexes, further guidance relating to
information sharing and sector-specific guidance that sets out how the Key Attributes should be
applied to insurers, financial markets infrastructures, and the protection of client assets in
resolution).
5. See infra Part I.B.

2015]

Addressing The Cross-Border Resolution Gap

185

organizations.6 Importantly, a recent initiative of the FSB introduced
contractual solutions to enhance cross-border recognition of resolution
measures, while also emphasizing the need for statutory solutions going
forward and delineating principles that can guide legal systems as they
develop statutory frameworks.7 However, the international community and
standard-setters have not yet undertaken a project to develop a
comprehensive legal framework with legislative provisions for cross-border
resolution.
This Article adopts a comparative approach. It draws lessons from the
Model Law and seeks to apply them to the resolution regime for financial
institutions. Additionally, the Article analyzes both possible reasons and
concerns that may have slowed the development of a cross-border
resolution framework with regard to financial institutions. In the process,
the Article highlights the importance of the most recent initiatives to
enhance certainty in the application of resolution measures across borders:
the ISDA8 Resolution Stay Protocol (the Protocol) and the FSB crossborder resolution project. In particular, these initiatives contribute to the
development and harmonization of the standard for the treatment of
financial contracts in insolvency and resolution.9 Prior to the FSB initiative
and the Protocol, the prevailing insolvency standard10 had aimed to promote
certainty of financial transactions according to the contractual terms
(transaction certainty). This standard allowed financial contracts to remain
Nkl0I+(-)Th +Q2/)Q8 )L+/(ML )LQ K0TH(*K/0 /O Ql+Hh )Q+2K0l)K/0 l0S TH/*Qout netting provisions, often at the expense of the failing firm.11 Later
developments regarding bank and SIFIs resolution, including the Protocol,
stress the certainty of effective resolution measures (resolution certainty)
that can briefly stay the termination and close-out netting rights in financial
6. See infra Part I, in particular, the initiatives of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and the IMF.
7. See infra Part I.
8. ISDA4* model contract, the ISDA Master Agreement, governs the vast majority of
financial contracts. See, e.g., INT4L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS4N, 2013 MASTER AGREEMENT
(2013).
9. A financial contract is an arrangement that takes the form of an individually negotiated
contract, agreement, or option to buy, sell, lend, swap, repurchase, or other similar individually
negotiated transaction commonly entered into by participants in financial markets. A financial
contract involves securities, commodities, currencies, interest or other rates, or any other financial
or economic interest similar in function. Financial contracts may be defined broadly to encompass
a broad variety of contracts and may include contracts entered into between any type of party, not
necessarily financial institutions. See U.N. COMM4N ON INT4L TRADE L., UNCITRAL
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, rec. 107, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]; see also infra Part III (the definition may be narrower and
apply to more specific types of financial contracts, or parties).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. Termination and close-out netting entails two steps: first, the termination of all open
contracts as a result of the commencement of insolvency/resolution proceedings (close-out);
second, the set-off of all obligations arising out of the close-out transactions on an aggregate basis
(netting).
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contracts. Increasing resolution certainty may in fact derogate from
transaction certainty (i.e., the certainty that the financial transaction will be
followed according to its terms and termination rights will not be stayed).12
These developments in the bank and SIFI resolution context have
contributed to the rethinking about the underlying goals of the insolvency
standard13 on the treatment of financial contracts, and the strengthening of
its rationale by considering goals beyond transaction certainty. Indeed, the
different uses and applications of the certainty objective highlighted its
elusiveness and limitation as a sole rationale for policy choices in this area.
This recognition of the limitation of certainty as a key policy objective has
resulted in an emerging standard on the treatment of financial contracts in
insolvency that reflects a balance between a wider range of interests that is
more consistent across insolvency and resolution regimes. This Article
argues that a broad approach and broader goal baseline, beyond the
pursuance of certainty (either transaction certainty or resolution certainty) is
also required for addressing the cross-border gap.
A focus on resolution certainty alone might constrain further
development of a global model for cross-border resolution, since a
consideration of a range of interests is required in that context to both
ensure stability and contain losses. Other constraints may stem from
concerns that the Model Law for commercial entities, from which
inspiration could be drawn, is perhaps not sufficiently relevant, as it is
arguably based on narrower objectives and different types of enterprise
structures. Additionally, there may also be concerns regarding the
feasibility of formulating and adhering to a framework solution in the near
future. The recognition of the Key Attributes as the standard for resolution
regimes may also raise concerns regarding the legitimacy of developing a
more rigid international instrument for the cross-border aspects of the
regime. This Article examines these constraints and addresses possible
concerns regarding the development of a model framework for cross-border
resolution.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the international
insolvency and resolution regulatory landscape, and highlights the
persistent gap on the resolution side. Part II explains the link between
concerns regarding a financial contracts4 termination in the event of
resolution and the focus of recent initiatives regarding cross-border
resolution that are aimed at enhancing certainty of resolution measures. Part
III illustrates how the current cross-border resolution initiatives broadened
the rationale of the standard on the treatment of financial contracts in
insolvency/resolution, and resulted in its rebalancing and increased
harmonization. Part IV argues that harmonization of standards would likely
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part I.A.
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improve the standardization of relevant measures across legal systems, thus
supporting a cross-border regime. However, such harmonization cannot
replace the design of a cross-border resolution framework.
I. THE GAP IN THE INTERNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
RESOLUTION
A. STANDARDIZATION IN INSOLVENCY AND THE CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORKS
In recent decades, there has been considerable effort to promote the
standardization and renovation of insolvency regimes through the
development of international best practice standards. UNCITRAL and the
World Bank have led the standardization project in this field, and the World
Bank Principles on Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes (the
World Bank Principles)14 together with the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide
on Insolvency Law (the Legislative Guide)15 constitute the international
best practice standard for insolvency regimes (the Insolvency Standard).
The Insolvency Standard delineates the key objectives of insolvency
regimes, and provides principles and recommendations on core provisions
for an effective and efficient insolvency law, including the commencement
of the proceedings, the treatment and use of assets, the treatment of
contracts, rules regarding set off, financial contracts and netting, rules
regarding priorities, reorganization procedures, and so forth. The standard is
also used as a basis for the assessment of countries4 insolvency regimes by
the World Bank through the joint World Bank/International Monetary Fund
(IMF) Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)
program.16
The World Bank Principles provide certain high-level elements of a
cross-border regime, stressing the need for a clear and speedy process for
obtaining recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, for granting relief
upon recognition, and for granting access to courts and other relevant
authorities. The World Bank Principles also stress the need to include
14. See WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR/DEBTOR
RIGHTS
SYSTEMS
(2015)
[hereinafter
WORLD
BANK
PRINCIPLES],
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/5807554-1357753926066/2015_Revised
_ICR_Principles(3).pdf.
15. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9; U.N. COMM4N ON INT4L TRADE L., LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, PART THREE: TREATMENT OF ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN
INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.16 (2010) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE PART THREE];
U.N. COMM4N ON INT4L TRADE L., LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, PART FOUR:
DIRECTORS4 OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No.
E.13.V.10 (2013).
16. See Insolvency ROSC Assessments, WORLD BANK: GLOBAL INSOLVENCY LAW
DATABASE, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXT
GILD/0,,contentMDK:22095878~menuPK:64873784~pagePK:4789622~piPK:64873779~theSite
PK:5807555,00.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
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measures for cooperation between courts and insolvency representatives,
and to ensure nondiscrimination between foreign and domestic creditors in
international insolvency proceedings.17
The Insolvency Standard contemplated in the Legislative Guide
explicitly recognizes the need for a global cross-border insolvency
framework and provides that countrie*4 K0*/H'Q0Th +QMK2Q* *L/(HS Q0lT)
rules on cross-border insolvency by adopting the Model Law.18 Indeed, the
Model Law provides the detailed global framework for cross-border
insolvency that countries can enact in their laws.19 It was endorsed in 1997
by UNCITRAL and thus far has been adopted in forty States.20 It provides a
set of model provisions that address key private international law aspects
related to insolvency. In particular, it articulates provisions regarding access
to foreign jurisdictions, recognition of foreign proceedings, assistance to
foreign courts and foreign representatives, relief to foreign representatives,
and cooperation between courts and foreign representatives.21
The Model Law applies to Ndebtors,8 individuals, or legal persons. It
guides countries to designate any types of entities, such as banks or
insurance companies, that are subject to a special insolvency regime or that
the State may wish to exclude from the Model Law.22 The Model Law does
not explicitly address the cases of enterprise groups, but UNCITRAL is
17. See WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 23.
18. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9, para. 14, rec. 5.
19. In addition to the global framework for cross-border insolvency, certain frameworks

govern cross-border insolvencies within regionsPnotably the EU Insolvency Regulation that
applies directly to all EU Member States, except Denmark who opted out. See Council Regulation
1346/2000, of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU
Insolvency Regulation]. Following previously failed attempts to agree on a treaty, the EU
Insolvency Regulation was enacted in 2000. The Regulation applies to debtors other than
insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment undertakings that provide services
involving the holding of funds or securities for third parties, and collective investment
undertakings. See id. art. 1(2). The EU Insolvency Regulation was recently reviewed to enhance
the effectiveness of cross-border insolvency and pre-insolvency solutions in Europe. See
Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on
Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19. EU Banks have been subject to a separate crossborder insolvency regime since 2001, pursuant to the Winding-Up Directive. See Council
Directive 2001/24/EC, of the European Parliament and Council on the Reorganization and
Winding-up of Credit Institutions 2001 O.J. (L 125) 15.
20. Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New
Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovenia, Uganda,
Great Britain, British Virgin Islands, United States of America, Vanuatu, Kenya, and the
seventeen OHADA countries that have recently adopted legislation based on the Model Law. See
UNCITRAL, STATUS: UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (1997)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL STATUS], http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1
997Model_status.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
21. See generally Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border InsolvencyKA
Legislative Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency,
12 TUL. J. INT4L & COMP. L. 307, 319R26 (2004); CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW (Look Chan Ho ed., 2012).
22. See MODEL LAW, supra note 3, art. 1(2).
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currently working to expand the Model Law to provide additional tools for
such enterprises.23
B. STANDARDIZATION EFFORTS IN THE GLOBAL RESOLUTION
CONTEXT
The financial crisis of 2007R2009 highlighted the need to design and
standardize the operation of specific regimes applicable to resolution of
financial institutions across borders. In 2011, the G-20 endorsed the Key
Attributes as a new international standard specifically designed to address
the particular objectives of resolution of SIFIs (the Resolution Standard).24
The Key Attributes are a non-binding standard that countries are
encouraged to implement and comply with over time. The Key Attributes
call for resolution authorities to be given a comprehensive toolkit of
powers. They also state the objective of effective resolution regimes and
delineate the key elements of such regimes, including: the designation of
resolution authorities; the entry into resolution; the type of resolution
powers that should be available in the regime; rules regarding set-off,
netting, collateralization, and segregation of client assets; safeguards for
creditors; and funding of firms in resolution.
Similar to the Insolvency Standard, the Resolution Standard
contemplated in the Key Attributes also recognizes the importance of
establishing a cross-border resolution framework. Indeed, the Resolution
Standard applies to financial institutions that are systemically significant
and whose failure would likely create systemic risk.25 As such, the
Resolution Standard is specifically relevant to complex financial
organizations that would often have a significant volume of cross-border
operations.26 Thus, addressing cross-border aspects of the resolution regime
is a critical component of the Resolution Standard. Specific Attributes of
the Resolution Standard delineate a set of main elements that the resolution
regime should adopt in order to enhance the effectiveness of cross-border
resolution.27 In particular, the Attributes state that national resolution
regimes should empower and strongly encourage the resolution authorities
to act to achieve a cooperative solution with foreign resolution authorities,
empower the resolution authorities to share information with their foreign
counterparts, and provide for transparent and expedited processes to give
effect to foreign resolution measures. However, unlike the Insolvency
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Issues International Standard for Resolution

Regimes 1 (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/pr_111104
dd.pdf?page_moved=1.
25. KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 4, § 1.1.
26. See Monica Marcucci, World Bank, Law, Justice and Development Week (2014)
(unpublished presentation notes) (on file with author) [hereinafter Marcucci Presentation Notes].
27. KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 4, §§ 7R9, 12.
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Standard, the Resolution Standard does not refer to a specific global model
that countries should adopt to give effect to such measures. Indeed, such a
generic or harmonized model for cross-border resolution does not exist.
C. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION IN
COUNTRY REGIMES AND IN PRACTICE
Implementation of the cross-border aspects of the Resolution Standard
contemplated in the Key Attributes has been uneven and slow. A peer
review conducted by the FSB in 2013 found that implementation of the core
aspects of the Key Attributes within the FSB4s membership is in an early
stage.28 In particular, Nnw]ith respect to cross-border cooperation, only a few
jurisdictions had established robust mechanisms to give effect to foreign
resolution measures, or gave their resolution authorities clear statutory
mandates to cooperate or to share information with foreign resolution
authorities.829 An IMF paper from 2014 further indicates that achieving
progress with recovery and resolution planning for individual cross-border
groups has proven challenging, and Nnf]irm-specific Cooperation
Agreements . . . coverage remains limited to procedural aspects of
cooperation, such as exchange of information, and does not include details
on resolution strategies to be pursued.830
There is an indication of some progress. The most notable development
occurred in May 2014, with the adoption of the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) by the European Parliament, which applies
alongside the Winding-Up Directive.31 Further, some other national
regimes, such as Singapore and Switzerland, have adopted measures in their
legislations aimed to address aspects of cross-border bank insolvency and
resolution. However, there are considerable differences in the regimes
prescribed even between the few countries that have independently enacted
cross-border provisions and the BRRD regime. For example, the BRRD
does not entail supportive measures, but rather recognition and means of
cooperation. Between Member States, the BRRD and Winding-Up
Directives are based on automatic recognition of a home country4*
28. FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVIEW ON RESOLUTION REGIMES, PEER REVIEW
REPORT 8 (2013) [hereinafter THEMATIC REVIEW], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_130411a.pdf?page_moved=1.
29. See IMF, Cross-Border Bank Resolution: Recent Developments, IMF Board Paper 9 (June
2, 2014) [hereinafter IMF 2014], https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/060214.pdf.
30. Id.
31. See Directive 2014/59, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 May 2014
Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment
Firms and Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC,
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU, 2013/36/EU, and Regulations
(EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council,
2014 O.J. (L 173) 190. The BRRD establishes a common EU-wide regime for the recovery and
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms in distress across all 28 Member States.
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resolution measures. The framework is very different in relation to nonR
Member States where safeguards as conditions to recognition are broad
(and, as noted elsewhere, potentially politically biased).32 Although the
Swiss legislation provides for recognition of foreign bank insolvency
proceedings or measures, the recognition period envisaged is long.33
Following the recognition of foreign bank insolvency proceedings or
measures, concurrent proceedings may be opened in Switzerland or assets
may be transferred to the home jurisdiction, subject to certain safeguards.
On the other hand, Singapore4* framework supports only certain foreign
measures, that is, the Ntransfer [of] the business or shares of a financial
institution or . . . [the] restructure or . . . issuance of shares, in support of a
foreign resolution action.834 More specifically, it provides for a limited
form of assistance, and it also requires Ministerial approval to exercise the
power of transfer of shares.35
Indeed, the 2007R2009 global financial crisis brought with it a series of
collapses of global financial institutions. These have been resolved in a
regulatory vacuum, resulting in outcomes that have been less than optimal
and even value destructive. In the case of Lehman Brothers, numerous
insolvency proceedings were opened around the world against Lehman4s
entities, followed by costly engagements in trying to reach ad-hoc
agreements on the coordination of proceedings. As a result, a multilateral
cross-border protocol was agreed upon and approved by the bankruptcy
judge presiding over the U.S. proceedings. However, not all subsidiaries
signed up and cooperated.36 The general cross-border Model Law for
insolvency of commercial enterprises lacked sufficient measures to address
a large geographically spread and decentralized group enterprise.37
Additionally, no specific cross-border resolution framework exists for
international financial institutions. In other cases of failing international
financial groups, like that of Fortis or the failure of the Icelandic banks,
governments took unilateral decisions based on territorial interests and
failed to cooperate, resulting in an overall loss of value.38
32. See infra Part II (ISDA response to the FSB Consultative Document on cross-border
recognition of resolution action).
33. NThe recognition proceedings generally take about two months, but may take longer
depending on the complexity of the case and the speed with which the necessary documents are
provided to [the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authorityma8 FIN. STABILITY BD., CROSSBORDER RECOGNITION OF RESOLUTION ACTION: CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 7 (2014)
[hereinafter FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/c_140929.pdf.
34. Id. at 7.
35. See id.
36. See Hon. James M. Peck, Cross-Border Observations Derived from My Lehman Judicial
Experience, 30 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT4L BANKING & FIN. L. 131, 132 (2015).
37. See id. at 133.
38. Jonathan M. Edwards, A Model Law Framework for The Resolution of G-SIFIs, 7 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 122, 131R33 (2012).
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D. CALLS TO ADDRESS THE CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION GAP
The Key Attributes attempted to address the need for international
resolution standards following the urgent calls for action in the aftermath of
the 2007R2009 global financial crisis. Yet, as noted above, they did not
provide a uniform framework for cross-border resolution. There have been
additional initiatives aimed at addressing the cross-border resolution gap,
notably the works of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision39 and of
the IMF that proposed measures for enhanced coordination.40 UNCITRAL,
(through Working Group V on Insolvency) also considered proposals in
2010 and again in 2013 to study the feasibility of developing an
international instrument regarding the cross-border resolution of large and
complex financial institutions.41 UNCITRAL noted that thus far no legal
framework at a global level had been developed for global financial
institutions, despite the widely acknowledged importance of the issue.42
Yet, the proposals have not reached the level of consensus on actions
promoting the development of a global framework. An IMF paper from
2014 continued to stress the high priority given to developing an effective
cross-border resolution framework, noting that Nnd]eveloping an effective
framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international
regulatory reform.843
A recent FSB initiative on cross-border recognition of resolution
actions (that commenced in 2013) offers additional solutions in the form of
contractual and statutory approaches in order to enhance legal certainty in

39. BANK FOR INT4L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 1 (2010) [hereinafter
BASEL REPORT], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.
40. This was in response to the calls of the G-20 leaders in 2009 to design an international
framework. See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 4R5.
41. See 5aUa !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Z0*/H'Q0Th Wlj> </**KkHQ ]()(+Q 3/+I>
Addendum, Proposal by the Delegation of Switzerland for Preparation of a Study on the
Feasibility of an Instrument Regarding the Cross-Border Resolution of Large and Complex
Financial Institutions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.93/Add.5, at 1 (F_G_e% 5aUa !/2240 /0
Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Z0*/H'Q0Th Wlj> </**KkHQ ]()(+Q 3/+I, Further Proposal by the Delegation of
Switzerland for Preparation by the UNCITRAL Secretariat of a Study on the Feasibility and
Possible Scope of an Instrument Regarding the Cross-Border Resolution of Large and Complex
Financial Institutions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/709, at 3 (F_G_e% 5aUa !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc
Insolvency Law: Insolvency of Large and Complex Financial Institutions, Note by the Secretariat,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.109, at 2, (2012) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Insolvency of Financial
Institutions]% 5aUa !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Z0*/H'Q0Th Wlj> "lTIM+/(0S Z0O/+2l)K/0 /0
Topics Comprising the Current Mandate of Working Group V and Topics for Possible Future
Work, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.117, at 8 (F_GEe% 5aUa !/2240 /0
Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Z0*/H'Q0Th Wlj> :QTQ0) pQ'QH/-2Q0)* !/0TQ+0K0M )LQ \H/klH l0S :QMK/0lH
Initiatives Regarding the Insolvency of Large and Complex Financial Institutions, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.118, at 2 (2013).
42. See sources cited supra note 41.
43. See IMF 2014, supra note 29, at 1.
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cross-border resolution.44 However, the initiative does not include a uniform
legal framework.
II. THE FINANCIAL CONTRACTS CONUNDRUM AND ITS
IMPACT ON CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION ENDEAVORS
A. THE FSB INITIATIVE ON THE RECOGNITION OF RESOLUTION
MEASURES
In 2013, the FSB took steps towards enhancing the effectiveness of
cross-border resolutions. The aim was to remove obstacles to cross-border
resolution and promote cooperation.45 More specifically, the ]9"4*
statements reflect recognition that the early termination of financial
contracts, protected under earlier international instruments, might prevent
effective resolutions and that the utilization of bail-in measures should also
be enhanced, to avoid bail-outs. Thus, the main concern has been
preventing large-scale termination of contracts that could lead to the
inevitable failure of the institution and the need for government rescue.46
Accordingly, the initiative envisaged the development of proposals for
contractual or statutory approaches that prevent large-scale early
termination of financial contracts and enhance certainty of resolution
measures.47
B. INCONSISTENCY OF PRINCIPLES
The concerns with large-scale termination of financial contracts were
realized in the recent global financial crisis of 2007R2009. With the rapid
expansion of derivative markets, there has been an evolution of legal
protections to financial contracts and encouragement by regulatory
authorities of the use of termination rights and close-out netting provisions
in such transactions. These protections were perceived important to the
stability of the financial system in order to avoid systemic risk in a failure
situation and have been embraced by the Insolvency Standard, as explained
below. Yet, the financial crisis of 2007R2009 revealed that the mechanisms
developed and promoted to prevent systemic risk could lead, in a situation
of general distress, to an accelerated systemic crisis, and to the inability to

44. See FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS TOWARDS ENDING N7OO-BIG-TOFAIL8c REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO THE G-20, at 3, 6 (2013) [hereinafter
FSB TBTF Report], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130902.pdf?pag
e_moved=1; FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 1R2; FIN. STABILITY BD.,
PRINCIPLES FOR CROSS-BORDER EFFECTIVENESS OF RESOLUTION ACTION 5 (2015) [hereinafter
FSB CROSS-BORDER PRINCIPLES], http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Principles-for-Crossborder-Effectiveness-of-Resolution-Actions.pdf.
45. See FSB TBTF Report, supra note 44, at 3.
46. Id. at 13R14.
47. Id. at 15R16.
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resolve a SIFI in financial difficulties.48 In the case of Lehman Brothers, the
large multinational investment bank )Ll) lH2/*) k+/(ML) S/j0 )LQ j/+HS4*
financial system when it collapsed in 2008, the early termination of many of
WQL2l04* assets (that were considered financial contracts) precluded a
resolution of the failed international financial group through a going
concern sale to another bank.49
This realization of the adverse effect of financial contracts4 termination
led to developments in principles concerning the treatment of financial
contracts, especially in the resolution context. Yet, the protections to
financial contracts in bankruptcy as envisaged in the Insolvency Standard
and the treatment of financial institutions under the newer Resolution
Standard could result in significant inconsistency, both domestically and
internationally, creating obstacles to effective resolutions. Thus, the
Insolvency Standard, proclaimed in the Legislative Guide, recommends that
close-out netting provisions in financial contracts, broadly defined, should
be completely Nimmunized8 from fundamental bankruptcy rules, including
the bankruptcy stay that stops individual enforcement of pre-insolvency
acquired rightsPreflecting the original thinking about the financial
contracts rule.50 The Resolution Standard proclaimed in the Key Attributes,
however, specifies that counterparties should be restricted from exercising
early termination rights that arise only by reason of, or in connection with, a
firm4s entry into resolution and, where such rights exist, resolution
authorities should have the power to stay counterparties temporarily from
exercising them. Under this Resolution Standard, following a successful
resolution action, counterparties will not be able to exercise their rights
against the financial institution that was under resolution.51 Additional
relevant principles include the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT) Principles on Close-Out Netting published in
2013 that limit the scope of the protected financial contracts to contracts
where one of the counterparties is a financial institution or a public
authority. The UNIDROIT Principles also take into account the possibility
48. See Marcucci Presentation Notes, supra note 26; Mark J. Roe, .#' 7'>!6E:!6'< JE>Z':1<
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 588 (2011); Stephen J.
Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123 (2010); Rizwaan J.
Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15 (2015).
49. See Edward J. Janger, Riz Mokal & Robin Phelan, Treatment of Financial Contracts in
InsolvencyKAnalysis of the ICR Standard: For Discussion at World Bank Insolvency and
Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force Meeting (World Bank Discussion Paper, Oct. 24, 2014)
[hereinafter
Task
Force
Discussion
Paper
2014],
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/WB_ICR_TaskForce_2014_FinancialCo
ntractsInInsolvency_DiscussionPaper.pdf.
50. See infra Part III (discussion of the insolvency standard in the treatment of financial
contracts in insolvency and its development); see also Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 493R94 (2010).
51. KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 4, at 4.

2015]

Addressing The Cross-Border Resolution Gap

195

that the domestic law will impose a stay on termination of financial
contracts in the context of its bank resolution regime, but also refer to the
broad protections and the exemption afforded to financial contracts from the
bankruptcy stay adopted in the Insolvency Standard.52 The EU Directive on
Financial Collateral Arrangements permits exemptions from immunities of
financial contracts to which one or more of the parties are neither a
financial market participant nor a public authority.53 Finally, the Bank
Resolution and Recovery Directive54 provides a resolution regime that
includes contractual termination rights.
Implementation of the measures contemplated in the Resolution
Standard concerning the treatment of financial contracts is a work in
progress.55 Assessment of legal systems and implementation of standards
has also been a somewhat protracted endeavor since the interplay between
banking and insolvency law differs between jurisdictions. Legal regimes
applicable to failing financial institutions may be a mix of general
insolvency law complemented by special provisions applicable to banks and
other financial institutions.56 Alternatively, the regime may treat banks and
other financial institutions in the same way as any other type of entity
without providing a special resolution regime. Thus, a different
international standard might apply to different aspects of the law relevant to
the resolution framework, leading to inconsistent implementation of rules
regarding the treatment of financial contracts, and less likelihood of a
coherent approach in cases of a cross-border resolution.57 For example, in
the United States, there is a special resolution regime for banks and SIFIs,
but non-bank, non-SIFI financial institutions must be resolved under the
Bankruptcy Code.58
Countries are also keen to ensure that their legal regimes adhere and
respect the dominant transactional standard in the over-the-counter (OTC)
derivative markets, the ISDA Master Agreement. Under the ISDA Master
Agreement, the insolvency of a derivatives4 counterparty, or the
52. PRINCIPLES

ON THE OPERATION OF CLOSE-OUT NETTING PROVISIONS, INT4L INST. FOR
UNIFICATION
OF
PRIVATE
LAW
56
(2013),
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/netting/netting-principles2013-e.pdf.
53. Directive 2002/47, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002, 2002
O.J. (L 168) 43, 46.
54. FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33.
55. See FSB TBTF Report, supra note 44, at 11.
56. The insolvency law may apply to banks as lex generalis, while special rules (lex specialis)
or exemptions from the general regime may apply where called for by the specifics of bank
insolvency. See Eva H.G. Hüpkes, Insolvency: Why a Special Regime for Banks?, 3 CURRENT
DEV. MONETARY & FIN. L. 471 (2005).
57. See Task Force Discussion Paper 2014, supra note 49, at 14R15 (noting that the
asymmetric treatment of financial contracts in bankruptcy and resolution contexts might be path
dependent but in any event it can create a variety of problems).
58. Edward J. Janger & John A.E. Pottow, Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial
Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 155 (2015).
THE
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commencement of resolution actions against it, can trigger certain close-out
rightsPincluding termination of the swap, foreclosure on collateral and
claim for payments.59 The need to comply with the industry4s unified
contractual approach created a further layer of inconsistency and a confused
implementation of emerging standards regarding the treatment of financial
contracts.
C. RESOLUTION UNCERTAINTY
The myriad of principles and standards, differing countries4 approaches
to the treatment of financial contracts, and no cross-border resolution
framework in place has created uncertainty concerning the recognition and
enforcement of stay measures. The FSB peer review of resolution regimes
from April 2013 found that the vast majority of resolution authorities do not
currently have powers to give effect to foreign resolution measures in their
jurisdiction in an expedited manner, and restrictions on termination rights as
required by the Key Attributes have not yet been widely applied.60
Therefore, it is unclear to what extent stays on termination rights under a
particular resolution regime would be enforceable against financial
contracts4 counterparties of a banking firm or group, located in different
jurisdictions and transacting under multiple laws.61
A global approach to cross-border resolution could, and perhaps should,
be universalist in nature.62 One approach could direct host countries, in
which the failing institution may have branches or subsidiaries, to defer to
the resolution-related laws of the home country that administer the main
resolution process. However, in the absence of a cross-border framework
that would subscribe to such a regime, countries may take different
approaches, and in particular may apply local laws and local measures with
lesser regard to the central process, taking place in the home country. Thus,
courts or authorities supervising resolutions may or may not defer to home
country laws regarding the treatment of financial contracts, with greater
uncertainty arising where the contract prescribes rights that are not
recognized by the host jurisdiction, or where the contract subjects the
59. The Master Agreement contains standard legal obligations including provisions addressing
events of default, termination events and immunity issues. See John Biggins & Colin Scott,
Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, the State and OTC
Derivatives Market Reform, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 309, 327, 345 (2012) (noting that the
ISDA Master Agreement is a strong, highly developed standard-setting regime, albeit a
contractual mechanism).
60. See THEMATIC REVIEW, supra note 28; see also IMF 2014, supra note 29 (noting that
resolution regimes were generally more developed for banks than for other types of financial
institutions, but, even for banks, they lacked important powers such as bail-in or the ability to
temporarily suspend early termination rights under financial contracts).
61. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 3R4.
62. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,
2277 (2000) (in the context of cross-border insolvency). See also infra Part IV.
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parties to a different system. The home country itself may lack measures for
staying the termination of financial contracts. The case of Lehman Brothers
is once again a telling example. Lehman4s financial contracts portfolio was
subject to different regimes, and different systems attempted to apply their
laws regarding the same contracts, ending with conflicting decisions
regarding the validity of the termination clauses included in the contracts.63
D. CONTRACTUAL AND STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Against this backdrop, an FSB expert group conducted surveys among
its members to identify the current obstacles to greater certainty regarding
the recognition of resolution measures. The expert group confirmed and
noted that most jurisdictions do not currently have statutory powers to
recognize and give legal effect to foreign resolution measures, and that
particular challenges arise in respect to stays on early termination rights
under financial contracts and the write-down and conversion of debt
instruments governed by foreign law.64 As a result, the FSB expert group
set out, in a consultative document, a package of considerations and policy
measures to address the legal uncertainties about the cross-border
effectiveness of resolution measures (the Consultative Document).65 The
Consultative Document generally recognized the importance of developing
a statutory regime that would address the obstacles. Indeed, the proposed
measures included elements of a statutory approach for cross-border
recognition, namely measures that countries may include within their
statutory resolution regimes.66 However, the Consultative Document
considered a statutory solution a long-term, complex endeavor, and
acknowledged that statutory solutions require more work by the standardsetter.67 Thus, in an effort to promote certainty, the FSB recommended that
contractual approaches to cross-border recognition be rapidly developed.
Specifically, the contractual solution aimed to make temporary stays of
early termination rights in financial contracts, and write-downs or
conversion of debt instruments in resolution, effective in a cross-border

63. See Perpetual Tr. Co. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd., [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1160 (Eng.);
Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Servs. Ltd., 422 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010).
64. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 3, 11.
65. See id. at 4R15.
66. See id. at 4R11.
67. Id. at 8, 11.
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context.68 The Consultative Document was developed into final principles
in November 2015 (the FSB Cross-Border Principles).69
E. THE RESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL AND ADDITIONAL
REGULATORY MEASURES
The response to the resolution certainty concern, through the adoption
of contractual solutions, has been primarily directed at reviewing the design
of financial contracts, in particular through addressing the ISDA Master
Agreement. Indeed, the FSB Too-Big-To-Fail Report stated that the G-20
authorities might encourage ISDA and other industry bodies to review
contract provisions to help prevent large-scale early termination of financial
contracts.70 Accordingly, in November 2014, ISDA published a Resolution
Stay Protocol that it prepared in consultation with home authorities of
global significantly important banks.71 The Protocol contractually opts
adhering parties into provisions within specific qualifying special resolution
regimes that limit the exercise of termination rights.72
Further policy measures discussed in the Consultative Document and
delineated in the FSB Cross-Border Principles focus on enhancing the
contractual approach through developing regulatory measures, namely
official measures to support the adoption of contractual stay provisions,
thereby making the contractual solution more effective and widespread. It
was acknowledged that any contractual solution binds only the parties that
agree to it. This limitation is particularly relevant in the context of
contractual agreements to stay or limit the exercise of early termination
68. See id. at 4, 8. See also Public Responses to the September 2014 Consultative Document
39>@<<-C@>)'> 0'+@$A!:!@A @% 0'<@X8:!@A =+:!@A<1, FIN. STABILITY BD. (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/12/public-responses-to-the-september-2014consultative-document-cross-border-recognition-of-resolution-actions/.
69. FSB CROSS-BORDER PRINCIPLES, supra note 44. The FSB Cross-Border Principles
include contractual as well as statutory elements for cross-border recognition and support with an
aim toward enhancing the effectiveness of resolution actions, as proposed in the Consultative
Document. Similar to the Consultative Document, the Principles stress that the contractual
l--+/lTL Tl0 /OOQ+ Nl j/+IlkHQ */H()K/0 (0)KH Tomprehensive statutory regimes for giving crossborder effect to resolution action[s] l+Q lS/-)QSa8 Id. at 6R7.
70. See FSB TBTF Report, supra note 44, at 6. In addition to addressing the ISDA Agreement
and developing other contractual measures regarding stays, the FSB identified a set of key
principles for recognition clauses in debt instruments that should support the exercise of bail-in
powers in a cross-border context. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 14.
71. ISDA 2014 RESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL (INT4L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS4N 2014)
[hereinafter 2014 RESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL], http://assets.isda.org/media/f253b54025/958e4aed.pdf. ISDA relaunched the resolution stay protocol in November 2015. The new
N50K'Q+*lH :Q*/H()K/0 9)lh <+/)/T/H8 (-Sl)Q* l0S Qi)Q0S* )LQ F_GD <+/)/T/H )/ T/'Q+ l jKSQ+
universe of financial contracts. See <+Q** :QHQl*Qc Z0)4H 9jl-* . pQ+K'l)K'Q* #**40c VlJ/+ "l0I*
Sign Relaunched ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol (Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Relaunched ISDA
Protocol], http//www2.isda.org/news/major-banks-sign-releunched-isda-resolution-stay-protocol.
72. The Protocol also provides for a stay that would apply in the context of a U.S. Bankruptcy
Code proceeding in relation to a financial holding company, whereby a recapitalization occurs and
the operating entities of the holding company remain viable going concerns. See id.
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rights since, in order to be effective, such provisions would have to be
adopted by both sides of the trade.73 Thus, it was recommended that global,
significantly important banks and, where appropriate, other firms with
significant derivatives exposures, be required to use contractual language
that replicated statutory stays of early termination rights under derivatives
and other similar financial contracts. This was particularly important when
parties traded with counterparts in jurisdictions that did not have statutory
recognition regimes.74 ISDA also announced that while the first phase of the
Protocol adoption involved adherence by major banks and certain of their
subsidiaries and affiliates who adhered to the Protocol on a voluntary basis,
the need for adoption by other institutions will likely depend upon the scope
of regulations that may be issued.75
At the same time, it was also recognized that regulatory measures to
enhance the contractual approach entail limitations in regards to reaching
non-regulated firms and ensuring their adherence to contractual solutions.
Regulatory powers through prudential rules may not be available in relation
to market participants that are not subject to requirements for resolution
planning and resolvability assessments.76 Many counterparties of
prudentially regulated firms, such as asset managers and non-financial
corporates, are not subject to prudential regulation. International financial
institutions are often organized as groups, where some of the entities in the
group may not be regulated.77 The options for reaching unregulated entities
by regulatory or other official action might be reduced to indirect means
through requirements on firms that are subject to prudential regulation or
direct requirements through market-based regulation.78
Implementation of the contractual solution has already been very
successful. First, the Protocol has been both drafted and launched. Second,
it has been adopted by an initial set of global systemically important banks
73. It is generally acknowledged that the contractual approach might entail certain limitations.
See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 11; FSB CROSS-BORDER PRINCIPLES,
supra note 44, at 8. The enforceability of contractual recognition provisions have yet to be tested
in the courts, and as a result, limitations on their enforceability may still exist (i.e., public policy
as a basis for nonenforcement). See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 11.
Furthermore, it is noted in the Consultative Document that where the contractual drafting differs
from statutory provisions, foreign counterparties may not be subject to precisely the same
standards as domestic counterparties. See id. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz et al., Comments on the
September 29, 2014 FS; 9@A<8X:E:!6' 7@+8B'A:G 39>@<<-Border Recognition of Resolution
=+:!@A1 (!)+a O/+ Z0)4H \/'Q+0l0TQ Z00/'l)K/0c !Z\Z <l-Q+ U/a CGc Dec. 3, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2537600&download=yes (arguing that the
contractual approach has limited utility because it only binds the parties to the contract and even
then its enforceability is questionable).
74. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33.
75. ISDA stated that it may publish amendments to the Protocol to reflect these regulations in
due course. See 2014 RESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL, supra note 71.
76. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 12R13.
77. See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 6.
78. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 12R13.
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and other large dealer banks. Third, it now governs existing and new OTC
derivative contracts between the adopting banks since the beginning of
2015.79 Fourth, FSB Members have also Nagreed to act in a coordinated
manner to promote . . . broad adoption of the contractual approach to
making temporary stays of early termination rights . . . in financial contracts
effective in a cross-border context.880 Finally, the approach has also
contributed to increased harmonization across insolvency and resolution
and to the rethinking of the Insolvency Standard regarding the treatment of
financial contracts, as discussed in the next section.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE CROSS-BORDER
RESOLUTION INITIATIVES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FINANCIAL CONTRACTS STANDARD
The contractual approach and generally the FSB cross-border resolution
and the Protocol projects discussed above are particularly important to the
understanding and development of the Insolvency Standard regarding
financial contracts. Although the initiatives aimed to address cross-border
issues rather than substantive laws, they highlighted the fact that the
existing Insolvency Standard regarding financial contracts has become
outdated and lacks a coherent rationale. Importantly, new thinking about the
standard is leading to the emergence of a more consistent and harmonized
approach
to
the
treatment
of
financial
contracts
across
insolvency/resolution.
A. INSOLVENCY STANDARD ON THE TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL
CONTRACTS: TRANSACTION CERTAINTY
The Insolvency Standard covers within its scope the insolvency
regimes of business entities. The Insolvency Standard does not address the
particular issues pertaining to financial institutions. However, it does cover
and serve as a basis for assessment of any rules in the insolvency system
that may also be applicable to these types of institutions. It was noted above
with regard to the treatment of financial contracts that the Legislative Guide
recommends a complete immunity for a broad range of financial contracts
from fundamental bankruptcy principles.81 NFinancial contracts should . . .
encompass existing varieties of financial contract[s] and . . . accommodate
new types of financial contract[s] as they appear,882 and exemptions
79. The relaunch of the ISDA Protocol in November 2015 increased the types of covered
financial contracts. See Relaunched ISDA Protocol, supra note 71.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Specifically, the commentary to the Guide explains that financial contracts include Namong
other things, securities contracts, commodities contracts, forward contracts, options, swaps,
securities repurchase agreements, master netting agreements and other similar contractsa8
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9, at 156.
82. Id. rec. 107.
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Nshould apply to all transactions that are considered to be 6financial
contracts,4 whether or not one of the counterparties is a financial
institution.883 Insolvency laws should recognize contractual termination
rights that permit the termination of those contracts promptly after the
commencement of insolvency proceedings. Where the insolvency law stays
the termination of contracts or limits the enforceability of automatic
termination clauses upon commencement of insolvency proceedings,
financial contracts should be exempted from such limitations.84 The
Legislative Guide further directs insolvency regimes to permit
counterparties to financial contracts to net or set-off obligations under the
terminated contract,85 Nto enforce and apply their security interest to
obligations arising out of financial contracts,886 and to protect the finality of
the netting, clearing and settlement, and exempt transfers from preference
or other avoidance laws.87
The World Bank Principles, prior to their recent amendment (discussed
below), also recognized the automatic termination, netting, and close-out
provisions contained in financial contracts, as an exception to the general
rule on the treatment of contracts in insolvency proceedings. In general, and
in order to achieve the insolvency objectives, the relevant principle provides
that it should be allowed to interfere with the performance of contracts
which may imply continuation, rejection, or assignment of contracts. In
particular, in order to gain the benefit of contracts that have value, the
insolvency representative should have the option of performing and
assuming the obligations under those contracts. Provisions that provide for
termination of a contract upon either an application for commencement or
the commencement of insolvency proceedings should be unenforceable.
Yet, the termination of financial contracts has been a special exception.88
This same complete immunity approachPwhich allows financial
contracts to remain remote from fundamental bankruptcy implicationsPcan
be seen in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code4s Nsafe harbors8 that exempt financial
contracts from the automatic stay and from voidable transactions
provisions.89 As noted elsewhere, the approach adopted in the Bankruptcy
Code reflects a desire to preserve the liquidity of securities markets, even at
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. rec. 106.
Id. rec. 101.
Id. rec. 102.
Id. rec. 103.
Id. rec. 104R05.
See WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 21.
Similar to the exemptions suggested in the Legislative Guide, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
exempts financial contracts from the automatic stay, and thus, Nipso facto8 or Ntermination8
clauses can be enforced upon bankruptcy, providing that obligations arising out of transactions
between counterparties can be set-off on an aggregate basis, and that any collateral securing the
contract or contracts could be sold. The transactions are also treated as final and exempt from
preference or other later avoidance for any reason other than intentional (or Nactual8) fraud. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27), 546(e), (f), (g), 555, 556, 559, 560, 561 (2012).
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the expense of an insolvent firm and its non-financial creditors. Indeed, the
effect of the safe harbors provisions was to allow certain creditors (i.e.,
counterparties to financial contracts), to make themselves Nbankruptcy
remote,8 while reducing the distribution to other claimants. Thus, the
operation of close-out netting and other early termination rights in
bankruptcy provided preferential treatment to the financial contracts4
counterparties of the insolvent firm. This adversely affects the position of
the general unsecured creditors of the insolvent entity, and allows a
significant derogation from the fundamental principle of equal treatment of
creditors in insolvency.90 Furthermore, the exclusion of the financial assets
that are subject to termination and netting rights that would otherwise be
available for use by the debtor, in the form of cash collateral, results in
limiting or eliminating the possibility for successful reorganization or a
going concern sale.91
Similarly, the Insolvency Standard had lesser regard for the
consequences of the exemptions afforded to financial contracts in terms of
fairness to the body of creditors, the likelihood that a restructuring can be
achieved, or the prospects of a going concern sale or orderly/coordinated
liquidation. The goal of the Insolvency Standard in regards to financial
contracts was to promote the certainty of (financial contract) transactions to
better ensure the stability of financial markets.92 The commentary to the
Legislative Guide notes that because of the way financial contract
transactions are structured and documented, it is imperative that there be
certainty as to what happens when one of the parties to such contracts fails
to perform, including for reasons of insolvency. Debtors often enter into
multiple financial contracts with a given counterparty in a single course of
dealing and the availability of credit is enhanced if rights under those
contracts are fully enforceable in accordance with their terms. The
commentary further explains that permitting close-out netting after the
commencement of insolvency is an important factor in mitigating systemic
risk that could threaten the stability of financial markets. Otherwise, a
debtor4s failure to perform its contract could result in the counterparty being
unable to perform its related financial contracts with other market
participants. The insolvency of a significant market participant could then
result in a series of defaults in back-to-back transactions, potentially
causing financial distress to other market participants and, in the worst case,
resulting in the financial collapse of other counterparties, including
regulated financial institutions.93

90. Task Force Discussion Paper 2014, supra note 49, at 1R3.
91. See Mark J. Roe & Stephen D. Adams, Restructuring Financial Firms in Bankruptcy:

Lessons from Lehman (Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 796, 2014).
92. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9, recs. 101R07.
93. Id. at 156R57.
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B. CONSIDERATION OF BROADER GOALS AND HARMONIZATION OF
STANDARDS
Other instruments concerning close-out netting provisions, financial
collateral arrangements, and resolution regimes are more nuanced in their
treatment of financial contracts (compared with the Insolvency Standard in
its original form), as they have drawn lessons from the financial crisis.94
These developments fueled a debate regarding the adequacy of the
Insolvency Standard concerning the treatment of financial contracts.95 It has
become apparent that there is significant inconsistency between the
Insolvency Standard and the Resolution Standard.96 The recent
developments in the area of cross-border resolution have been particularly
instrumental to the debate.97 As previously noted, the contractual approach
developed in the context of the FSB cross-border resolution initiative aimed
principally at dealing with the financial contracts conundrum. Yet, the
approach entailed certain inevitable limitations, especially in terms of its
possible reach to different types of entities, including those that are not
prudentially regulated and entities within a group that may be subject to the
bankruptcy regime. The limitations of the contractual and regulatory reach
of the contractual solution emphasized the importance of greater
consistency of the standard regarding financial contracts across the sections
of the law, particularly to ensure that the stay measure is widely applicable
in appropriate circumstances.
Importantly, the FSB cross-border resolution initiative prompted the
rethinking of the rationale underlying the Insolvency Standard, in particular
the appropriateness of )LQ *)l0Sl+S4* focus on ensuring certainty of
OK0l0TKlH T/0)+lT)*4 )+l0*lT)K/0* as a means to promote stability. The
different uses of certainty as a rationale for the design of
insolvency/resolution standards highlighted the elusiveness and limitation
of certainty as a sole objective. Indeed, in the context of the cross-border
94. See supra Part II.
95. See discussions of the World Bank, NInsolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force

Meeting8 K0 January 2011 and November 2013. See GILD, WORLD BANK: GLOBAL INSOLVENCY
LAW DATABASE, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/
EXTGILD/0,,menuPK:64873782~pagePK:4789692~piPK:4789698~theSitePK:5807555,00.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2015); !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc :ep. of Working Group V (Insolvency
Law) on the Work of Its Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/798, at 8R9 (2014) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Working Group V].
96. See Janger & Pottow, supra note 58.
97. See discussions from the World Bank, NLaw, Justice and Development Week, Panel on the
Resolution of Financial Institutions8 in October 2014. See Law, Justice and Development (LJD)
Week 2014: Financing and Implementing the Post-2015 Development Agenda, WORLD BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2014/10/20/law-justice-and-development-week-2014
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2015); Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force Meeting on the World
Bank Principles on the Treatment of Financial Contracts, WORLD BANK: GLOBAL INSOLVENCY
LAW DATABASE, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/
EXTGILD/0,,contentMDK:23633430~menuPK:9713419~pagePK:4789622~piPK:64873779~the
SitePK:5807555,00.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
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resolution work, the key aim has been increasing resolution certainty rather
than transaction certainty, namely ensuring the effectiveness of authorities4
resolution measures and increasing certainty in the application of such
measures in multiple jurisdictions. Thus, contracts should be subject,
through recognition clauses, to laws that are compliant with the Resolution
Standard and that impose the temporary stay. This shift in the goal to
ensuring the effectiveness of authorities4 resolution stay measure, including
at the expense of transaction certainty, reinforced the importance of
pursuing goals beyond transaction certainty with regard to the treatment of
financial contracts.
Transaction certainty is an important aspect in the goal of enhancing
efficiency, including upholding pre-insolvency acquired rights in the course
of insolvency proceedings, promoting commerce and the grant of credit,
and avoiding perverse incentives at times approaching insolvency.98 Yet,
generally, certainty and economic efficiency must be pursued with regard to
rules that are justified on a broader fairness basis that seek to accommodate
all interests involved.99 Indeed, any creditor would wish to be certain that
their dealing with a business would be respected according to the
transaction terms and would not kQ lOOQT)QS kh )LQ k(*K0Q**4 K0*/H'Q0Th.
However, insolvency requires the consideration of other interests and
objectives, including: the possibility of rescuing a business; achieving a
result in the course of the insolvency process that is beneficial for the
creditors as a whole; and ensuring equitable treatment of creditors.100 Thus,
independent enforcement may be stayed in insolvency, transactions may be
cancelled if they entail a preference to certain creditors at the expense of
other creditors, and the distribution of the insolvency estate may take into
account policy considerations leading to a degree of redistribution of preacquired rights.101
The Insolvency Standard delineated in the Legislative Guide, in its
general proclamation on objectives of insolvency systems, in fact embraces
such a broad approach to insolvency goals, and emphasizes the need to
balance a range of interests in the design and application of insolvency
98. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173
(1987); Douglas G. Baird, ;EAZ>8?:+R1< -A+@A:'<:') =T!@B<, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 580R82 (1998);
Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989); IAN F. FLETCHER,
INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 2005) (noting the respect of security
interests created prior to the onset of insolvency as an internationally recognized fundamental
principle, crucial for a system of credit).
99. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 811 (1987);
Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
717, 781 (1991); VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 40R41 (1st ed. 2002);
RIZWAAN J. MOKAL, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: THEORY AND APPLICATION 24R25 (1st ed.
2005).
100. See sources cited supra note 99.
101. These are fundamental aspects of insolvency regimes recognized in the insolvency
standard. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9, paras. 7, 13.
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laws. Thus, the Legislative Guide states that one key objective of
insolvency systems is enhancing certainty in the market to promote
economic stability and growth. Yet, it also explains that other objectives
should be pursued in a balanced manner. Insolvency laws should enable
reorganizations, and pursue such solutions when on balance of interests it
can be the most fair and efficient result and ensure equitable distribution to
creditors.102 However, the standard rule that seeks to ensure complete
bankruptcy remoteness of financial contracts is based heavily on
(transaction) certainty, and fails to take account of all relevant interests and
implications of the contemplated immunities. Certainty of transaction is
upheld, and the risk of contagion and market instability considered, yet
there is little regard to the impact of the immunities on the stakeholders as a
whole in the event of insolvency, and the chances to rescue the business
following the close-out netting of the financial contracts.
This one sided approach to the treatment of financial contracts in
insolvency is changing. In view of the newer developments and, in
particular, the emphasis of the cross-border resolution initiative on
K2-/*K0M +Q*)+KT)K/0* /0 -l+)KQ*4 +KML)*c TQ+)lK0)h /O )+l0*lT)K/0 2lh 0/
longer be viewed as a sole, leading goal. At the end of 2014, the World
Bank Global Task Force on Insolvency and Creditor-Debtor Regimes,
which regularly reviews the World Bank Principles, decided to analyze the
existing principle on the treatment of financial contracts with a view of
ensuring that it is based on a coherent justified rationale.103 Importantly, the
limitation of certainty as a lead goal in the design of insolvency/resolution
rules and the need to consider the interests of the collective body of
creditors, while also taking into account market stability concerns, has been
acknowledged in discussions of the Task Force4s expert group.104
The World Bank expert group accordingly proposed certain
amendments to the original principle that has been a component of the
Insolvency Standard on financial contracts. The World Bank expert group
acknowledged the possibility of imposing a temporary stay on termination
and close-out netting, particularly in order to accomplish the orderly
transfer of contracts to a solvent counterparty, and setting forth criteria for
determining which contracts should be accorded this special treatment.105
The articulated goal of revising the principle was to enable the standard to
reflect and facilitate implementation of post-crisis norms (i.e., to increase
102. See id. ch.1, sec. B.
103. See World Bank, Working Group Meeting Notes, Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes

Principles: The Treatment of Financial Contracts in Insolvency (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTGILD/0,,cont
entMDK:23659444~menuPK:9771000~pagePK:4789622~piPK:64873779~theSitePK:5807555,0
0.html (follow N^i-Q+) \+/(- VQQ)K0M U/)Q*8ea The author has led the Task Force in her capacity
as senior counsel at the World Bank.
104. See id.
105. See id. para. 6.
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harmonization).106 Accordingly, the view was that the principle on financial
contracts should be revised to allow assessors of legal systems to recognize
jurisdictions that are in compliance with best practice standards and within
the scope of permitted approaches, including those contemplated in the
Resolution Standard.107 The revised principle now takes into account such
newer developments and, importantly, it bridges the gap between the
previously differing approaches to insolvency/resolution.108
IV. PROGRESSING TO A FRAMEWORK SOLUTION FOR
CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION
A. ADDRESSING THE CRITICAL GAP IN THE INTERNATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RESOLUTIONS

The deliberations coordinated by the FSB for addressing obstacles in
regard to cross-border resolution, is an opportunity to fill the important gap
in the international financial infrastructure concerning cross-border
insolvency and resolution (i.e., the absence of a global framework for
resolution). The effort to enhance standardization and harmonization
through effective implementation of the Key Attributes (i.e., the Resolution
Standard) is instrumental to the development of a cross-border resolution
framework. Indeed, the improvement of the Insolvency Standard regarding
the treatment of financial contracts and the increasing cross-sector
consistency of best practice standards are likely to accelerate harmonization
of national resolution-related laws, which in turn can support a cross-border
resolution framework.

106. See id. para. 7.
107. See id.; Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force (May 27, 2015), WORLD

BANK:
GLOBAL
INSOLVENCY
LAW
DATABASE,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTGILD/0,,cont
entMDK:23659444~menuPK:9771000~pagePK:4789622~piPK:64873779~theSitePK:5807555,0
0.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
108. The principle was revised by Professor Janger at the request of the World Bank Insolvency
and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force and was endorsed by the Task Force in May 27, 2015.
See Rodrigo Rodriguez, Task Force Meeting: Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes
0E??@>:'8>1<
/RA@?<!<,
WORLD
BANK
(May
27,
2015),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/ICR_Task_Force_2015_Rapporteur_Syn
opsis_Rodriguez.pdf; see also WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 14. The part of the standard
provided in the UNCITRAL Guide has not been revised yet, and is still in its original 2004 form.
However, Working Group V of UNCITRAL has resolved to address the issue in future
deliberations as a matter of priority. See UNCITRAL Working Group V, supra note 95; U.N.
!/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Insolvency Law: Treatment of Financial Contracts and Netting;
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/851 (2015). The
Commission has not yet provided the Working Group with a mandate to pursue the revision,
noting that for now the Working Group should focus on the topics currently before it. See U.N.
!/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc :Q-a /0 )LQ 3/+I /O Z)* ]/+)h-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/70/17, at
para. 359 (2015).
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Standardization and harmonization of measures for resolution improve
the infrastructure for a cross-border resolution regime and may instill
greater mutual trust among the key players, including the supervisory and
resolution authorities. The need to reach a high quality convergence in order
for a cross-border regime to operate effectively has been stressed by
standard-setters. The IMF 2010 report noted that the legal framework for
the authorities involved in global group-wide resolution would need to
share certain key features, in particular concerning nondiscrimination
against foreign creditors, effective intervention tools, appropriate creditor
safeguards, and sufficiently harmonized rules on priority.109 Harmonization
and convergence is also one of the manners envisaged by the Resolution
Standard for achieving cross-border effectiveness and cooperation.110
However, notwithstanding the import of harmonization, and the
necessity of a degree of convergence for an effective operation of a crossborder resolution framework, a cross-border framework itself should be
created in order to address the private international aspects pertaining to
resolution. Harmonization is a slow process and indeed progress has been
mixed.111 Additionally, it is not likely that full harmonization will ever be
achieved. Furthermore, complete harmonization may not be desirable due to
possible impeding effects on the local developments of resolution regimes.
Domestic resolution regimes may evolve over time and countries may
develop certain new concepts and measures to address new challenges.
Indeed, it is through such experiences and developments that the regulatory
landscape may remain modern and fit for purpose.112 Finally, even if
resolution regimes are fully harmonized, a cross-border framework would
still be required. Such a framework could prescribe the degree of
coordination in implementing the (harmonized) measures and the manner of
cooperation or centralizationPin particular whether a certain authority
takes the lead in the initiation and conduct of measures.
This Part seeks to address possible constraints and concerns that may
impede the further development of cross-border solutions and their
transformation into a global framework. This discussion draws from the
experiences of developing and implementing international standards and
109. See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 19R21; see also Eva H.G. Hüpkes, Rivalry in Resolution,
How to Reconcile Local Responsibilities and Global Interests?, 7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV.
216 (2010).
110. See KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 4, at 4. The Key Attributes state that NKn order to
facilitate the coordinated resolution of firms active in multiple countries, jurisdictions should seek
convergence of their resolution regimes through the legislative changes needed to incorporate the
tools and powers set out in these Key Attributes into their national regime.8 Id.
111. An IMF 2014 report also warns that implementation of the Key Attributes would only
partially align divergent national interests and incentives that work against cooperative crossborder resolution strategies. See IMF 2014, supra note 29, at 23.
112. See Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law
Harmonization in the European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT4L ECON. L. 939 (2006).
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cross-border solutions in the commercial context. Additionally, this
discussion seeks to highlight the relevance of the enterprise cross-border
model framework to the deliberations on a framework for financial
institutions. This Part does not attempt to provide detailed proposals of
model provisions for cross-border resolutions. Specific models for crossborder resolutions have been proposed in other studies,113 yet so far, such
proposals have not been taken fully on board. Therefore, this Part aims to
promote the idea of a framework solution and argues for the relevance of an
equivalent framework for commercial entities. Indeed, central to the
motivation for putting these ideas forward is the concern that without fully
acknowledging the importance and adequacy of a framework approach for
financial institutions4 resolution, proposals for specific models will not
materialize into concrete action.
B. CONSTRAINTS DERIVING FROM A FOCUS ON CERTAINTY
The recent initiatives on recognition of resolution measures (the FSB
initiative and the Protocol) discussed above aimed to promote certainty in
the enforcement and effectiveness of resolution measures when they are
applied, specifically a stay on the financial contracts. The focus on
resolution certainty has been important in view of the financial contracts
conundrum. The initiatives sought to mitigate and rebalance earlier
inclinations to focus merely on certainty of the financial transactions
according to their terms. The initiatives also assisted in the development
and harmonization of the standards across the resolution and insolvency
fields.
Yet, to fully address the cross-border gap, a broad set of goals should
be considered, and solutions should aim to ensure stability and contain
losses through a fair and effective cross-border regime. For that purpose,
the range of interests relevant to the design of a cross-border regime should
be taken into account, in particular the benefits that may ensue from
centralized or coordinated solutions and the possible concerns regarding
local interests if resolutions are handled or coordinated from outside host
jurisdictions. In other words, a cross-border regime should promote a
solution that provides the level of a desired global approach to multinational
default, beyond the certainty of recognition of specific measures. A focus
on certainty problems alone may impede the development of a framework
solution that relies on a broad consideration of goals.
To the extent that the cross-border resolution policymaker would seek
to achieve a sufficient level of universality in cross-border resolution cases,
it would need to design a uniform approach for resolution that seeks to
harmonize private international aspects pertaining to resolution. The higher
degree of universalism sought, the higher level of uniformity and the higher
113. See infra note 134.
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level of centralization that would be required, in terms of deference to a
foreign forum and foreign laws. Universalism is founded on the idea of
Nunity of bankruptcy;8 for every given debtor there would be a unified
process of administration of the estate in the event of insolvency.114 This
corresponds with the assertion that, as insolvency should entail a collective
process, an effective insolvency system should be symmetrical with the
market, covering all or nearly all transactions and stakeholders in that
market.115 In resolution, a universal solution may need to include
obligations related to key issues such as selection of a lead authority and
burden sharing.
Territorialism, on the other hand, stresses state sovereignty and
emphasizes the importance of, and unique distinctions between, national
legal regimes. It strives to ensure minimum interference with domestic
policies. It also suggests that nations may be concerned about subordinating
their own bankruptcy laws and policies to the laws and policies of another
jurisdiction.116 In the resolution context, a territorial approach may entail
the de-globalization of financial institutions. Thus, under a territorialist
system, institutions would function as stand-alone subsidiaries, separately
within each jurisdiction.117
A middle-ground approach, so called Nmodified universalism,8 seeks to
promote global solutions while giving due regard to local expectations and
concerns.118 In the resolution context, a middle-ground approach advocates
enhanced coordination between resolution authorities as a balanced solution
between universality and territoriality.119
A cross-border regime and the elements it would comprise of, including
the recognition of various resolution measures, should be based on this
fundamental policy choice between universality and territoriality, reflecting
the wide consideration of relevant goals. Decisions regarding both the type
of instrument sought, in particular whether it is a more coherent uniform
model, or merely guidelines for national legislatures, and regarding the
content of the regime should reflect this policy choice.

114. See FLETCHER, supra note 98, at 11R12.
115. See Westbrook, supra note 62, at 2277. The concept of collectivism in insolvency is

widely accepted in bankruptcy theory. See FLETCHER, supra note 98, at 8R10; Andrew T.
Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defence of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000).
116. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2218R20 (2000) (Professor LoPucki developed a mitigated version of
territorialism known as Ncooperative territorialism8 that encourages cooperation based on
agreements between the appointed insolvency representatives); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and
Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT4L L. 5, 8R9, 12 (2003); Frederick Tung, Is International
Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT4L L. 31 (2001).
117. See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 15.
118. See Westbrook, supra note 62, at 2277.
119. See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 15.
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Indeed, the emergent consensus has been that a middle-ground
approach that facilitates a degree of global approach in cross-border
resolution is most appropriate and most realistic.120 In both restructurings
and liquidations, a global approach is paramount to containing the systemic
impact of the bank failure and to realizing coordination benefits.121 Yet,
regard should be given to the impact of the resolution solution on the
interests of local creditors and the country4* financial stability.122 The Basel
Committee advocated in 2010 for an enhanced coordination approach
among resolution authorities as a middle ground solution that balances
between territoriality and universality.123 It recommended that national
authorities develop procedures to facilitate the mutual recognition of crisis
management and resolution proceedings and/or measures. The IMF 2010
report proposed possible elements of a framework that would underpin the
middle-ground approach, to facilitate coordination across borders without
requiring a surrender of national sovereignty. The Resolution Standard
contemplated in the Key Attributes also reflects a policy choice that would
encourage maximum cooperation and support, while safeguarding local
interest.124
To give full effect to the middle-ground choice, a uniform instrument in
the form of a concrete agreement on a global scale is required. High-level
principles cannot guarantee the desired level of coordination, support,
assistance, and conflict avoidance. Observing the experience of the
development of private international tools for commercial cross-border
insolvency is telling. In that context, it has been acknowledged that a
universal approach can promote effective and fair solutions for failing
global enterprises by avoiding the dismemberment of a business and by
considering the interests of the collective body of creditors wherever
located. At the same time, creditors may have localized expectations that
require consideration, particularly in view of limited harmonization of
laws.125 Modified universalism seemed to be the preferred approach, but
attempts to achieve such approach through country-by-country development
of private international law rules has been futile. In fact, it increased
conflicts and resulted with greater territorialism, even though countries have
attempted to design such laws in order to resolve the problem of conflict

120. See id. at 16R17.
121. See id. at 12. The report mentions the cases of Fortis and Lehman Brothers that

demonstrated how the existing territorial approach had failed to realize coordination benefits.
122. See id. at 18.
123. See BASEL REPORT, supra note 39.
124. See KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 4, at 7.
125. See FLETCHER, supra note 98, at 445; Harry Rajak, The Harmonization of Insolvency
Proceedings in the European Union (World Bank Glob. Forum on Insolvency Risk Mgmt. 2003);
Westbrook, supra note 62, at 2277.
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created by differing national insolvency regimes.126 International
fragmentation of policy and approach to cross-border insolvency issues has
had negative effects and eventually led to the development of framework
solutions.127
Indeed, standards and principles regarding cross-border aspects of
insolvency or resolution regimes can mitigate diversity of private
international law rules. Yet, their implementation is still prone to
fragmentation and cherry picking of specific principles, resulting in
continuing conflicts and even asset-grabbing.128 It is also difficult to create
a structured framework through implementation of standards. Standards
may specify aspects of the cross-border system and provide key concepts on
what it should include. However, only a model framework could provide
the required precision and delineation of steps in the process. The design of
a complete set of uniform provisions that would be implemented as is,
could as a whole, prevent fragmentation and significantly mitigate the risk
of incompatible and conflicting rules.
Contractual solutions of the sort promulgated in the recent cross-border
resolution initiatives that require recognition of certain measures may
enhance certainty of application of those measures. The statutory approach
that encourages inclusion of recognition and support measures in each
country4* laws pursuant to assisting principles, may further increase the
certainty that measures can be recognized and supported in other
countries.129 However, such solutions are insufficient for addressing the
cross-border gap that requires a broader goal baseline, namely, a framework
that would reflect the middle-ground approach between universality and
territoriality. Thus, each country, in compliance with principles delineating
elements of statutory solutions, may attempt to provide greater clarity
within the national regime regarding the recognition and support measures
available. However, clarity and availability of recognition measures within
each regime might not result in a uniform adoption of the relevant rules
across jurisdictions, and might not ensure that the rules themselves would
adequately reflect the desired balance between universality and
territoriality.130
126. See FLETCHER, supra note 98, at 7. Professor Fletcher refers to the Nfamiliar paradox of
the subject of private international law, namely that the rules which have been developed within
each system of law for the purpose of accommodating the conflicting effects of different national
laws have somehow contrived to perpetuate, albeit at a different level and in a different way, the
very syndrome of diversity which originally inspired them.8 Id.
127. Id.
128. See Bob Wessels, Giving Legal Effect to Foreign Resolution Measures in the Financial
Sector, 28 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 44 (2015).
129. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 8R11 (elaborating on the statutory
approach); FSB CROSS-BORDER PRINCIPLES supra note 44, at 11R13.
130. Indeed, the FSB Consultative Document and the FSB Cross-Border Principles mention that
the elements of statutory regimes delineated in the documents are not intended to be
comprehensive; each jurisdiction will need to consider what is required in the context of its own
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Indeed, if the middle-ground approach is pursued, an international
agreement is required on a range of matters, including: the timeframe and
conditions for recognition or for refusal to grant recognition, whether
recognition would relate to the proceedings or to specific measures, and
whether support or relief would be automatic or discretionary. A crossborder regime would need to be designed accordingly and with sufficient
detail, so that it can be implemented as a complete framework in different
legal systems. Only then would the cross-border regime be compatible with
its goal, as it would provide the desired degree of universality while taking
due account of local concerns.
C. CONCERNS ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF THE MODEL LAW
Recent important proposals for addressing cross-border resolutions
have referred to and built on the Model Law.131 Indeed, the Model Law is
the only global model available for cross-border insolvency and hence an
expected point of reference. The Model Law for commercial entities has
been designed with the view of providing a high level of uniformity in the
application of private international law aspects, while safeguarding local
creditor expectations and allowing host countries to retain some control in
the administration of cross-border insolvency. Thus, the Model Law
facilitates the recognition of a main proceeding and the granting of relevant
assistance and relief to such proceedings. It also accommodates the
possibility that additional non-main or limited proceedings concerning local
assets might be opened in other jurisdictions, while promoting cooperation
and coordination in such cases. It also provides a level of flexibility in the
granting of a range of relief to the main, or non-main, proceedings,
following their recognition.132 There are also specific provisions regarding
interpretation of the model provisions, requiring taking into account the
international origin of the framework in its implementation, in order to
promote uniformity.133
Yet, notwithstanding the frequent reference to the Model Law in the
discussions of the problem of cross-border resolution, there is a level of
legal system for the recognition framework to be effective. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT,
supra note 33, at 1; FSB CROSS-BORDER PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, at 5R6.
131. See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 32R33 (drawing largely on the Model Law for the content
of the proposals); see also Jonathan M. Edwards, A Model Law Framework for The Resolution of
G-SIFIs, 7 CAP. MKTS. L.J., 122 (2012); Rosa M. Lastra, Northern Rock, UK Bank Insolvency,
and Cross-Border Bank Insolvency, 9 J. BANKING REG. 165, 175R77 (2008); Jay L. Westbrook,
SIFIs and States, 49 TEX. INT4L L.J. 327 (2014); Schwarcz, supra note 73 (criticizing the
contractual approach contemplated in the consultative document and suggesting focusing on a
*)l)()/+h l--+/lTLc +QOQ++K0M )/ )LQ 5U!Z7:#W V/SQH Wlj l* l N-+lT)KTlH lH)Q+0l)K'Q8 )/ l )+Ql)h
that NLl* -+/'QS *(TTQ**O(H K0 l +QHl)QS T/0)Qi)8ea
132. Except for the stay of proceedings and enforcement, which is automatic upon recognition
of main proceedings, other relief (e.g., entrusting the realization of the debtor assets located in the
host state to a foreign representative) is discretionary. See MODEL LAW, supra note 3, arts. 20R21.
133. See MODEL LAW, supra note 3, art. 8.
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skepticism about the Model Law4s relevance to the financial institution
context. It has been noted that the Model Law was designed for corporate
non-bank enterprises, and it did not address group structures, which are the
prevalent form of global financial institutions.134 Financial institutions are
arguably more complex and the model law approach might be too simplistic
in that context.
1. 19= +#"=0 ./%): Bearing on Financial Institutions
The Model Law is a general model for cross-border insolvency. It is
applicable to any debtor, including individual persons and legal entities. As
previously noted, the Model Law allows jurisdictions to exclude certain
entities, such as banks, that are subject to special insolvency regimes, from
the scope of the framework. It does not exclude, though, such entities
outright from its scope, and does not envisage that the regime it proposes
would be completely irrelevant to such entities. In fact, the Model Law
notes in its Guide to Enactment that it is not advisable to exclude all cases
of insolvency of credit institutions.135
At the same time, the Model Law takes into account the fact that
financial entities may be subject to special regimes. Indeed, it is widely
acknowledged that the regulation and treatment of bank insolvency has
certain specific objectives, and therefore bank insolvency requires special
rules. It has been argued in this respect that because of the need to consider
objectives other than maximization of the estate value, most countries have
chosen to treat bank insolvencies differently from ordinary commercial
insolvencies.136 In addition to creditor and debtor interests, bank insolvency
law must consider the public interest, and in certain circumstances, this
consideration may justify a departure from the Npari passu8 principle, which
holds in general insolvency law.137 It is further argued that the differences
between general insolvency law and bank regulatory rules are even more
striking in the international context since national insolvency rules are
based predominantly on the principle of territoriality, whereas in banking
regulation the principles of consolidated supervision are applicable.138 With
134. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 38, at 124R25, 135 (specifically noting the failure of the
Model Law to address groups and to satisfy the universalist benefits); EVA H.G. HÜPKES, THE
CHALLENGES OF INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 379 (Henry Peter, Nicolas
Jeandin, Jason Kilborn eds., Verlag Schulthess 2006). The FSB Consultative Document also notes
that the Model Law is generally not applicable to financial firms and does not include specific
rules regarding enterprise groups. See FSB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 7. The
IMF 2010 paper notes the great relevance of the Model Law, but also notes the fact that it does not
address groups. See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 32R33.
135. See MODEL LAW, supra note 3, paras. 58R59.
136. See Hüpkes, supra note 56, at 13. Hüpkes also notes the distinct features of bank
insolvency (i.e. the involvement of the bank supervisor and the deposit protection agency). See
also Edwards, supra note 38, at 140.
137. See Hüpkes, supra note 56, at 12.
138. Id. at 28.
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regard to systemically important global financial institutions, it is further
stressed that the complexity of such institutions presents specific
challenges. CountrKQ*4 incentives to achieve multinational solutions in cases
of failure of globally important financial institutions need to be aligned
through prescribing country roles in default scenarios and establishing
burden-sharing arrangements.139
Notwithstanding the specific concerns and special goals of resolving
international banks and particularly globally systemically important
financial institutions (G-SIFIs), it is also important to acknowledge the
significant commonalities in terms of the goals baseline to appreciate the
relevance of drawing lessons from cross-border insolvency. As indicated in
Part III above,140 international proclamations of insolvency objectives have
emphasized goals beyond certainty of transaction and beyond value
maximization for existing creditors. There is a consensus that an insolvency
regime should balance between a range of interests, and may pursue social
policies such as encouraging the development of an entrepreneurial class
and protecting employment.141 An insolvency regime may therefore allow
the redistribution of pre-insolvency acquired rights,142 or take on board to
encourage a reorganization even if existing creditors would prefer a
liquidation.143 In regards to cross-border insolvency, it is agreed that
pursuing the broad range of goals requires coordination between
jurisdictions, facilitation of the provision of assistance to foreign
proceedings, and recognition of foreign proceedings, by adopting the Model
Law in national regimes.144 The Model Law aims to achieve a wide range of
goals, including promotion of cooperation, greater legal certainty, fair and
efficient administration of cross-border insolvency proceedings,
maximization of the value of the estate, facilitation of rescue of distressed
businesses, protecting investment, and preserving employment.145
Thus, the Model Law for commercial entities supports broad objectives
of insolvency systems, and it is specifically designed to depart from pure
territorialism. It facilitates fair and effective solutions of cross-border
insolvency cases through the provision of a uniform framework that
carefully balances universality advantages and territorial concerns, allowing
for a wide range of insolvency or restructuring solutions. It provides an ex
ante pre-defined regime that specifies the steps that can be taken by those in
control of the process to ensure that there is a sufficient degree of
coordination and a global approach over the multinational default. A special
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Edwards, supra note 38, at 125, 143R45.
See infra Part III.B.
See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9, para. 3.
See id. para. 13 (Nequitable treatment may be modified by social policy on priorities8).
See id. para. 3.
See id. para. 14, rec. 5.
See MODEL LAW, supra note 3, pmbl.
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regime for international financial institutions may seek to achieve similarly
broad goals by the use of a similar instrument, adjusting it to fit the
peculiarities of cross-border resolution.
2. Skepticism About The Model Law): Relevance to Group
Structures
A key skepticism about the Model Law and commercial insolvency4s
relevance to financial institutions is related to the treatment of enterprise
groups. Global financial institutions tend to operate as groups, and
supervision is often on the group level. While in the bankruptcy scenario
the group might be split into the various legal entities, an entity-by-entity
approach might not be effective given the intertwined activities within a
financial institution group and the potential for spillover effects from other
companies in the group. In particular, it is noted that there is a tendency for
foreign subsidiaries and branches to centralize core operational capacity at
the head office in their home jurisdiction, and that an international
framework should acknowledge such structures.146 The key problem with
the current state of affairs is that financial groups operate globally, while
the frameworks for addressing their distress and failure are still local and
apply to distinct parts of the group rather than to the group as a whole. 147
The relevance of the universalism-territorialism debate has also been
questioned in view of the prevalence of group structures in global financial
institutions.148
The
similarities
of
challenges
concerning
cross-border
insolvency/resolution are striking, though, even when considering the
Ngroup problem.8 In the commercial enterprises4 context too, enterprises
increasingly tend to operate as groups, especially when conducting crossborder businesses. Similar issues of disconnect between the way the
enterprise has been operating in the ordinary course of business, as an
integrated enterprise, and the way it might be addressed when insolvent,
fragmented to the entities, arise in the general insolvency context.149 In the
recent Nortel saga, the primary struggle has been how to achieve a fair and
efficient solution for the highly integrated global enterprise group. Multiple
proceedings were opened in multiple jurisdictions. An initial agreement
resulted in pooling the assets of the group entities together. A prolonged
and costly legal battle on the allocation of the proceeds ensued, eventually
resulting in dual decisions of the US and Canadian courts concerning pro

146.
147.
148.
149.

See Hüpkes, supra note 56, at 31; IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 7.
See IMF 2010, supra note 2, at 8.
See id. at 15.
See generally IRIT MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
GROUPS (2009).
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rata distributions among all creditors of the group.150 Thus, the need to treat
an international group as a unit, in order to maximize its value, minimize
costs of multiple uncoordinated processes, and avoid conflicting decisions,
is an important aspect of both commercial entities4 and financial
institutions4 cross-border regimes.
Admittedly, a key deficiency of the Model Law has been the absence of
explicit rules regarding groups. The Model Law addresses and provides
provisions on access, recognition, and relief to foreign proceedings of
debtors, not groups, and on cooperation and coordination in cases of
multiple proceedings regarding the same debtor. However, and importantly,
the Model Law does not exclude groups from its scope. Notably, the
practice shows that many cross-border insolvency cases of groups have
been addressed effectively under the Model Law. In many group cases,
proceedings regarding affiliated entities have been centralized in a single
jurisdiction, often at the headquarters from where the group entities were
managed, and recognition was granted to that jurisdiction, thus facilitating
group solutions.151 Courts could have acknowledged in these cases that the
center of main interests (COMI)152 of all entities, regarding which
recognition was sought, was in the same place. Recent revisions to the
Guide to Enactment of the Model Law enhanced this approach by clarifying
that the presumption that COMI is at the entity4s registered office can be
rebutted, primarily by a finding concerning the location of the entity4s
central administration (headquarters), as ascertainable by third parties.153
The headquarters of entities in an integrated group are often at a single
location, where the group is centrally controlled.154 Thus, the Model Law
has been applied in a manner consistent with the modified universalist
paradigm that seeks to promote global solutions to multinational default, in
a group context too, facilitating value maximization through seeking global
group solutions.
3. ,""<=::7$; 19= +#"=0 ./%): &4<#6!-4/!The more difficult scenarios that were not always properly addressed
under the existing scheme of the Model Law have been those where groups
were structured with greater decentralization, such as in cases like Nortel
150. See Nortel Networks Corp. (Re), [2015] ONSC 2987 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); In re Nortel
Networks, Inc., 469 B.R. 478 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
151. See Irit Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 517, 537R43
(2011).
152. The center of main interests is the jurisdictional test and basis for recognition of foreign
proceedings as foreign main proceedings under the Model Law. See MODEL LAW, supra note 3,
arts. 2, 16.
153. See id. para. 145.
154. See Irit Mevorach, The Home Country of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing
Insolvency, 57 INT4L & COMP. L.Q. 427, 440R45 (2008).
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and Lehman Brothers.155 UNCITRAL therefore tasked itself to address the
Ngroup gap8 and to expand the Model Law (possibly through adding a
supplement to the Model Law) to include additional tools to facilitate group
solutions in cross-border cases. Deliberations acknowledge the fact that the
existing Model Law may already apply in certain group scenarios (i.e.,
where the group was sufficiently centralized and a mutual COMI can be
identified). Consideration is given to allowing a degree of centralization or
at least coordination of group proceedings, in addition to cooperation
measures, also in circumstances where entities had separate centers in
different countries. Thus, entities belonging to the same enterprise group, or
to an integrated part thereof, may commence coordinated proceedings in a
forum where at least one of the entities that is an important and integral part
of the group solution is centered. In that forum, a joint group solution may
be developed and implemented in the jurisdictions of the separate entities.
Consideration is given to providing additional measures to avoid the
opening of proceedings in host jurisdictions, subject to safeguarding the
rights of local creditors.156 Such solutions may assist in resolving more
effectively cases of large, widespread, and decentralized enterprise groups.
This initiative on cross-border insolvency of groups, which is still in
progress, is linked to previous work that was concluded in 2010, when
UNCITRAL adopted a set of recommendations that were added to the
Legislative Guide on matters pertaining to enterprise groups in insolvency.
Thus, the Legislative Guide now includes recommendations on measures
such as procedural coordination, substantive consolidation, intra-group
post-commencement finance, voidable intra-group transactions, and joint
reorganization plans. It provides important background information and
recommendations on how to resolve the difficult dilemma between the need
to respect the corporate form and the need to take into account the
economic realities of groups.157 Indeed, resolving group insolvency
effectively requires that domestic regimes have in their systems certain
specific measures for the treatment of groups. For example, in certain
circumstances, groups might be so highly integrated in terms of their assets
and liabilities that attempting to unscramble the estates would involve
disproportionate costs. In such circumstances, the applicable insolvency law
155. See Jay L. Westbrook, Coordination in International Corporate Insolvencies, in Lastra,
supra note 131, at 187.
156. See generally 5aUa !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Insolvency Law: Facilitating the CrossBorder Insolvency of Multinational Enterprise Groups, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.128 (2015);
5aUa !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Z0*/H'Q0Th Wlj> ]lTKHK)l)K0M )LQ !+/**-Border Insolvency of
Multinational Enterprise Groups: Key Principles, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.133 fF_GCe% 5aUa !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc Z0*/H'Q0Th Wlj> ]lTKHK)l)K0M
the Cross-Border Insolvency of Multinational Enterprise Groups: Revised Draft Legislative
Provisions, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.134 (2015). The deliberations
are still ongoing and the work was not yet finalized at the time this Article went to print.
157. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE PART THREE, supra note 15.
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should allow consolidation of the estates.158 The definition of Nenterprise8
for the purpose of these recommendations provides that specially regulated
entities not covered by the insolvency law are not intended to be included.
Yet, it has also been noted that banks often form part of a multinational
enterprise group.159 Indeed, similar concepts and measures may be
important for resolution of banking groups and financial institutions, and
may require further development of attributes to this effect to ensure the
availability, in a standardized manner, of relevant solutions. As
aforementioned, the current focus of the ongoing work by UNCITRAL on
multinational group insolvency is on the strengthening of the cross-border
framework. That work, in conjunction with the previous additions to the
Legislative Guide concerning groups, might be of particular relevance to
the development of a special cross-border regime for resolutions of
financial institutions where group structures are dominant.
Thus, the Model Law is becoming increasingly relevant and can be
usefully analyzed and considered in the process of closing gaps in the crossborder insolvency/resolution infrastructure, while bearing in mind both the
specialness of resolutions and the imperfectness of any currently available
cross-border regime.160 In the process of analyzing and transposing crossborder concepts, it might become apparent that some of the issues
addressed in the Model Law can be more easily and effectively addressed in
a cross-border resolution model, contrary to the impression that the
financial institutions case is more complex. For example, the determination
of the home country jurisdiction that would coordinate a cross-border
process might be simpler in a financial institution context, both in single
entity and group cases.161
158. Consolidation may be full or partial; for example, certain assets, claims, or entities may be
excluded from the consolidation. Consolidation may also be allowed in circumstances of fraud.
See id. recs. 219R31. The well-known example of a global substantive consolidation approach is
an international banking group, BCCI, where the main entities were inextricably intermingled. The
insolvency representatives agreed on substantive consolidation in protocols approved by the
relevant courts. See Mevorach, supra note 149, at 215R35; EVA H.G. HÜPKES, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
BANK INSOLVENCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WESTERN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA, STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE CORPORATE AND FINANCE LAW 139R51 (1st ed. 2000).
159. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE PART THREE, supra note 15, glossary, para. 4(b), and sec. 1, para.
9; UNCITRAL, Insolvency of Financial Institutions, supra note 41, para 60.
160. Another gap recently identified in the Model Law concerns the uncertainty regarding the
extent to which insolvency-related judgments can be recognized and enforced under its scheme.
See Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46. UNCITRAL is therefore currently deliberating on
providing additional tools (possibly a separate but related Model Law) on recognition and
enforcement of insolvency related judgments. See also 5aUa !/2240 /0 Z0)4H 7+lSQ Wljc
Insolvency Law: Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments,
Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.130 (2015). Another issue identified by
UNCITRAL as requiring further work is the issue of unifying choice of law rules. See
UNCITRAL Working Group V, supra note 95, at 8.
161. See Edwards, supra note 38, at 141R43 (noting that unlike commercial entities, global
financial institutions are significantly regulated by one country on a consolidated basis, making it
easier to design a rule that predictably identifies the home country of the enterprise group in the
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D. CONCERNS ABOUT FEASIBILITY
Another concern with regard to the development of global agreements
or models is that any such uniform framework solution might not be
feasible because it might require excessive surrender of state sovereignty
and control. Additionally, a uniform global model might also undermine
territorial concerns that are critical in the context of the default of banks.
Furthermore, global solutions would run contrary to countries4 inclination
to ring-fence assets and to focus on local interest. The result is that without
a binding agreement, a uniform framework is not feasible, yet such a
binding agreement is arguably unlikely to be achieved at least in the near
future.162
Similar concerns have been expressed in the enterprise context. It has
long been the general view that nations tend to be concerned about
surrendering sovereignty in insolvency matters and apply a Ngrab rule8
approach in practice.163 If given the possibility and the flexibility, countries
would opt for territorialist insolvency solutions. It is also argued that even
with the introduction of the cross-border insolvency Model Law, courts still
feel bound by their local system, and are likely to continue practicing their
inherent territorialist inclinations.164 The territorialist inclination might even
be particularly evident in cases of enterprise groups, especially with respect
to local subsidiaries, where courts may disallow Nrelocation8 of local
entities to centralized proceedings abroad.165
However, notwithstanding these difficulties, in 1997, deliberations
between country representatives, NGOs, and inter-governmental
organizations resulted in a detailed global model for cross-border
insolvency, as it was acknowledged that such a model is required for a
cross-border regime to work effectively.166 A significant number of
country that regulates and supervises the global institutions4 holding company on a consolidated
basis). See Westbrook, supra note 155, at 192.
162. See, e.g., Hüpkes, supra note 56, at 30; Lastra, supra note 131, at 184 (arguing in favor of
an international convention on cross-border bank insolvency, yet acknowledging that this may
take some time for political and legal reasons and is likely to require a step-by-step approach).
163. Territorialists have generally stressed that a territorial regimePallowing the opening of
separate territorial proceedings in the different countries where the international enterprise has
presencePnot only maintains the unique distinctions between legal regimes, but also corresponds
with sovereignties4 tendency to insist on applying their own insolvency laws to domestic assets
and claimants. See LoPucki, supra note 116, at 2216; Avi-Yonah, supra note 116, at 8R9, 12;
Tung, supra note 116, at 31.
164. See LoPucki, supra note 116, at 700.
165. Indeed, territorialists suggest that a territorial approach is a better fit with the way
enterprises operatePthrough local subsidiaries organized in different legal regimes with assets in
the country where they operate. Id. at 750.
166. Westbrook, who actively participated in the design of the UNCITRAL Model Law, has
noted that Nreformers active in the insolvencies of multinational corporations have had to
overcome much the same sort of skepticism and parochialism that impede current efforts to
achieve international cooperation in resolving the crises of financial institutionsa8 Westbrook,
supra note 155, at 186.
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countries endorsed and adopted the Model Law.167 In fact, it has been
somewhat easier and more feasible to see progress in the area of crossborder insolvency than with regard to implementation of standards on
substantive measures. Since the Model Law was formulated, it has been
gradually implemented quite robustly and uniformly in a significant number
of countries. On the other hand, the adoption of standards provided in the
Legislative Guide has been a more protracted process, making the tracking
and assessment of compliance more difficult. The Model Law has also been
usually applied in accordance with a modified universalist vision, both in
single and group cases.168
The concerns about state sovereignty and local control should not be
underestimated, yet they can and should be addressed by the model itself,
rather than impede an agreement on a framework. The design of a model for
cross-border resolution is required in order to achieve the needed level of
universality. However, the regime will need to include the appropriate
safeguards and a level of host country control to comply with the so-called
middle-ground approach. The adoption of a model law instrument can also
overcome a (presumably) more difficult process of implementing a treaty,
and the absence of other legal mechanisms for creating supranational
regimes that countries would be obliged to implement, or that would be
applicable in national systems.169 Although a model law is not binding until
it is enacted, and although it may allow some degree of flexibility in
implementation, it can provide the method for enacting the complete
framework in the law, creating a regime that works almost like a treaty or
like directly applicable regulation. It also has the advantage of being
applicable in cases where one or more of the jurisdictions involved in a
167. Until recently, twenty-two countries adopted the Model Law, including significant
economies such as the US, UK, Japan, and Mexico. Recently, eighteen more countries adopted
legislation based on the Model Law (the OHADA countries and Kenya). See UNCITRAL
STATUS, supra note 20.
168. Empirical studies evidence that the Model Law framework has largely managed to
promote a level of universalism. Thus, most countries that adopted the Model Law enacted it
almost verbatim, although a few countries did deviate from some of its provisions, or included
other provisions (e.g., South Africa also included a reciprocity requirement). The Model Law4s
recognition provisions are usually speedily applied and with limited litigation, and courts tend to
provide a range of relief tailored to the specific case. See Mevorach, supra note 151, at 517; Jay L.
Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the United States of the Model Law on
Cross Border Insolvency, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2013); cf. Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15
Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evidence from United States Bankruptcy Court Cases, 29
WISC. INT4L L.J. 110 (2011).
169. Indeed, there has been limited positive experience with treaties in cross-border insolvency,
even within the EU. The changed nature of the EU cross-border insolvency instrument from a
treaty to regulation has been important as it bypassed an otherwise lengthy process of ratification
by each state that might have lasted years. EU regulations, on the other hand, are governed by the
main EC Treaty and their provisions are binding and directly applicable. For further background,
see FLETCHER, supra note 98, at 339R58. The methods of directly applicable regulation, or
directives that oblige countries to implement uniform solutions, require a legal infrastructure that
is not available on the global level.
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cross-border case did not enact the framework, since it might not require
reciprocity. In this respect, the framework can have a wider application
compared with a treaty (if the latter is not signed by all countries).170 Thus,
for example, under the Model Law for commercial entities, administrators
from countries that did not adopt the Model Law can invoke its recognition
and relief provisions adopted by another jurisdiction where there are assets
or a branch of the entity under insolvency.171
E. CONCERNS ABOUT LEGITIMACY
One might also question the legitimacy of developing the principles
proclaimed in the Key Attributes (and in the more recent FSB initiative)
into a more rigid model, now that the Key Attributes have been recognized
as the standard in the resolution field. It might be argued that the Key
Attributes have already determined the degree of universalism to be
pursued, by choosing the form of principles rather than model provisions.
Thus, the concern might be that progressing to a uniform framework will
not be consistent with the recognized Resolution Standard.
Yet, the Key Attributes should not be seen as an obstacle to the
development of a uniform framework. The Key Attributes appropriately
addressed the wide range of issues pertaining to resolution, including
private international aspects, even though there is a limitation to what a
general standard could achieve in terms of providing a private international
law framework. Regarding the cross-border issues, the Key Attributes set
the general objective of achieving maximum cooperation and support,
reflecting the middle-ground approach, i.e. a level of universalism while
taking into account territorial concerns. As a general Resolution Standard
with a set of principles, the Key Attributes cannot do more than that. Yet,
the Key Attributes do not preclude the development of a uniform
framework that could achieve the standard4s objectives concerning crossborder resolutions.
In this respect too, it is useful to refer to the commercial enterprise
context where, like the Key Attributes, a legislative guide provides
standards regarding the broad spectrum of issues pertaining to insolvency,
including recommendations regarding cross-border issues.172 Cross-border
aspects are included in the Legislative Guide as it covers and sets the
standard regarding the broad range of aspects pertaining to insolvency
170. The Model Law has the force of law in the enacting state. Following adoption, it is binding
and enforceable.
171. Empirical evidence shows that, for the most part, recognition and relief has been granted
by jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Law to foreign proceedings and foreign
representatives from a wide range of jurisdictions. See Mevorach, supra note 151, at 536;
Westbrook, supra note 168, at 254.
172. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9, recs. 30R34; LEGISLATIVE GUIDE PART THREE,
supra note 15, recs. 239R54.
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regimes, and may be a useful instrument to any country that may reform
and renovate its laws, whereas a model law requires specific adoption of a
framework in a uniform manner. Yet, the Legislative Guide also
recommends enacting the Model Law to provide for a modern, harmonized,
and fair framework that can effectively address instances of cross-border
insolvency.173
CONCLUSION
International organizations have made significant efforts in recent years
to advance international cooperation in both insolvency and resolution and
promote the renovation and convergence of relevant laws. Nonetheless, the
international legal infrastructure for multinational entities in distress is still
incomplete. Both the general legal regime for commercial enterprises and
the specific regime for financial institutions require improvements. Yet, the
regime for cross-border resolution still lacks the overarching framework for
recognition and relief that can be applied uniformly, as is and as a whole, in
different countries, avoiding fragmentation and divergence. In that regard,
the general cross-border regime, with its cross-border model that has been
adopted in a significant number of countries and has been in operation for
more than a decade, can serve as a relevant point of departure. While
acknowledging the special characteristics of multinational financial
institutions, the similarities between the challenges facing both commercial
entities and financial institutions in situations of cross-border defaults
should also be born in mind. The general cross-border regime, like the one
that may be envisaged for financial institutions, aims to streamline crossborder processes, align incentives to cooperate, facilitate speedy action and
provide tools for cooperation and coordination, in order to promote fair and
efficient cross-border solutions that can maximize value through liquidation
or reorganization.
The need to address the damaging effect that the termination of large
volumes of financial contracts had in the recent financial crisis demanded
the focused attention of international organizations that had to rethink and
to harmonize standards regarding the treatment of these contracts. It is
critical for the effective operation of resolution regimes that termination and
close-out netting of contracts can be temporarily stayed, and that a stay is
given effect across borders. The work on enhancing recognition of the stay
measure is also likely to increase standardization in this area and alleviate
some uncertainty regarding recognition of some of the critical measures for
effective resolution. Standardization is also likely to enhance the coverage
of resolution actions beyond prudentially regulated entities and parties to
the resolution stay protocol. The next step should be the creation of a
framework for cross-border resolution. Such a framework should expand its
173. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 9, para. 14, rec. 5.
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objectives-base beyond certainty (of transaction or of resolution measures)
and have regard to the general goal of promoting stability and containing
risk through a fair and effective cross-border resolution regime.
Accordingly, it should comprehensively address the private international
issues concerning the operation of the range of resolution measures across
borders and be applicable to all entities relevant to a resolution solution.
This approach, which would be based on a certain degree of universalism
(i.e., a global approach to multinational default), would rely on uniform
application of the private international laws pertaining to resolution.
By drawing from the experience of developing a cross-border
insolvency regime for commercial entities, this Article argued that the
development and adoption of a uniform framework for cross-border
resolution is both feasible and legitimate. The Article did not attempt to
propose the details of such a framework, but rather to provide justifications
for taking the model framework approach. Various specific proposals for
the design of such models have been put forward in other works. Yet, the
concern is that without a conviction that a model approach is appropriate,
proposals will not be developed into actual legislative reform. This Article
argued that enactment of a uniform structured framework is in fact simpler
than transforming general principles into domestic laws. In addition, the
general cross-border regime already provides a platform for further
deliberations, and certain private international concepts that have been
developed in the general regime are likely to be easier to implement in the
resolution context. The principles contained in the Resolution Standard (the
Key Attributes of effective resolution regimes) should not be seen as
constraining the development of a more concrete structured framework for
cross-border resolution.

